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Boyd and Richerson (1996) observe that while cultural transmission is common 
in nature, cumulative culture is rare. We suggest an explanation for the low 
probability of the emergence of human-like cumulative culture, composed of 
increasingly complex form-function associations. The role of naturally selected 
socio-cognitive biases on the origins of human culture is well studied; we focus 
on the coevolution of those human biases and the cultural environment (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman, 2003).  
Evolutionary transitions often involve the emergence of a new way to 
transmit information (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995) and are rare because 
of conflicts between the requirements of the existing and the emerging systems.   
The earliest human cultural traditions (Oldowan and Acheulean techniques) 
originate around 1.5-2.5 mya (transition 1) and persist for over one million years 
with negligible modification. Subsequent stable traditions are orders of 
magnitude shorter, suggesting a second transition around 105 years ago resulting 
in a dramatic increase in the rate of cultural complexification. We propose that 
symbolic cumulative culture is rare because the psychological biases favoured 
by the first transition are at odds with those required for the second transition.  
1. The transition to cultural transmission results in the “common” kind of 
culture where whole behaviours (techniques, vocalisations etc) associated to 
whole functions are transmitted faithfully between individuals and persist, with 
little modification, over the generations. For language, this corresponds to 
Wray’s (1998) protolanguage stage. In natural evolving systems, the majority of 
transmission errors, particularly discrete or qualitative ones, result in disruption 
or loss of function. If extant cultural behaviours are advantageous, they will pose 
a selective pressure for the co-evolution by natural selection of cognitive biases 
for errorless transmission, such as faithful imitation including theory of mind. 
2. The transition to “rare” cumulative culture occurs when not only whole 
behaviours for whole functions, but elements of those behaviours associated 
with sub-functions can be transmitted, in other words, when forms and meanings 
 can be subject to analysis. This transition requires flexible imitation so that 
elements of existing behaviours, which may or may not have a utility function as 
standalone units, can be perceived, learned and transmitted independently and, 
crucially, recombined in new ways – compositional or otherwise (see Wray & 
Grace, 2007) – to fulfill and to create novel complex functions.  
A small collection of idiosyncratic form-function associations combined 
with a bias for rigid imitation would tend to prevent the generalization needed 
for noticing, processing and expressing the patterns within and between cultural 
items that characterize symbolic cumulative culture. However, increasingly 
conspicuous patterns emerging in a growing set of independently discovered 
cultural forms could help overcome this conflict. Social-group size increase and 
contact between groups may have facilitated this transition. 
In sum, we propose that in the human lineage, a first cultural transition 
leading to the co-evolution of cultural innovations and faithful imitation allowed 
holistic replication of form-function pairs during the transmission of 
functions/meanings. A second transition involving analytic imitation led to 
replication and recombination of fractional form-function units, which allowed 
the transmission of form structure. Analytic replication could only have emerged 
when imitation stopped being exclusively holistic without ceasing to be faithful, 
perhaps in response to the increasingly complex structure of the cultural 
environment. 
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